Operating Facilities for Aviation (Ahmet Alper GÖL)

Aviation Facilities

The general location of an aviation facility is governed by many factors, including base conversions, overall defense strategies, geographic advantages, mission realignment, security, and personnel recruitment. Site conditions must be considered when selecting a site for an aviation facility. The site considerations include, but are not limited to: topography, vegetative cover, existing construction, weather elements, wind direction, soil conditions, flood hazard, natural and man-made obstructions, adjacent land use, availability of usable airspace, accessibility of roads and utilities, and future expansion capability. All facilities and functions directly involved in maintaining, servicing, controlling, and flying combat aircraft are considered related to ammunition and explosives on the flightline supporting those combat aircraft. Flightline related facilities and functions, which have in common, the need to directly support the same combat aircraft, can be considered integral parts of the aircraft generation; this also applies to  flightline munitions operating locations and pre-load areas. Because the combat aircraft generation cannot progress without their combined efforts, these flightline support functions and facilities may be considered to each other, if they are considered related to the combat aircraft. Aviation facilities typically are designed for a specific aircraft known as the "critical" or "design" aircraft, which is the most operationally and/or physically demanding aircraft to make substantial use of the facility. The critical or design aircraft is used to establish the dimensional requirements for safety parameters such as approach protection zones, lateral clearance for runways, taxiways and parking positions, and obstacle clearance. In many cases, the "geometric" design aircraft may not be the same aircraft as the "pavement" design aircraft.

Runways and Other Surfaces

Runways are attractive targets for enemy aircraft to take out. A bomb is dropped on a runway, which creates a large crater putting the runway out of commission. If aircraft can't get off the ground, then they can't fight. Rapid runway repair is a long, tedious process that is vital to success on the battlefield and in the skies. The main focus in airfield repair is the Minimum Operating Strip (MOS), which the United States doctrinally defines as 15 by 1,525 square meters for fighter aircraft and 26 by 2,134 square meters for cargo aircraft. Take-off and landing areas are based on either a runway or helipad. The landing/take-off area consists not only of the runway and helipad surface, shoulders, and overruns, but also approach slope surfaces, safety clearances and other imaginary airspace surfaces. Aviation facilities normally have only one runway. Additional runways may be necessary to accommodate operational demands, minimize adverse wind conditions or overcome environmental impacts. A parallel runway may be provided based on operational requirements. Class A runways are primarily intended for small light aircraft. These runways do not have the potential or foreseeable requirement for development for use by high performance and large heavy aircraft. Ordinarily, these runways are less than 2,440 meters [8,000 feet] long and have less than 10 percent of their operations that involve aircraft in the Class B category. Class B runways are primarily intended for high performance and large heavy aircraft. The capacity of a single runway system will vary from approximately 40 to 50 operations per hour under IFR conditions, up to 75 operations per hour under VFR conditions. Parallel runways are the most commonly used system for increased capacity. In some cases, parallel runways may be staggered with the runway ends offset from each other and with terminal or service facilities located between the runways. Where practical, parallel runway centerline separation of at least 5,000 feet (1 525 m) is recommended. Crosswind runways may be either the open-V or the intersecting type of runway. The crosswind system is adaptable to a wider variety of wind conditions than the parallel system. When winds are calm, both runways may be used simultaneously. An open-V system has a greater capacity than the intersecting system. Runway overruns keep the probability of serious damage to an aircraft to a minimum in the event the aircraft runs off the runway during a take-off or lands short during a landing. Overruns are required for the landing and take-off area. Aircraft arresting systems consist of engaging devices and energy absorbers. Engaging devices are net barriers, disc supported pendants (hook cables), and cable support systems which allow the pendant to be raised to the battery position or retracted below the runway surface. Energy absorbing devices are ships anchor chains, rotary friction brakes, such as the BAK-9 and BAK-12, or rotary hydraulic systems such as the BAK-13 and E-28. The systems designated "Barrier, Arresting Kit" (BAK) are numbered in the sequence of procurement of the system design. There is no connection between the Air Force designations of these systems and their function. Runways are identified by the whole number nearest one-tenth (1/10) the magnetic azimuth of the runway centerline. The magnetic azimuth of the runway centerline is measured clockwise from magnetic north when viewed from the direction of approach. For example, where the magnetic azimuth is 183 degrees, the runway designation marking would be 18; and for a magnetic azimuth of 117 degrees, the runway designation marking would be 12. For a magnetic azimuth ending in the number 5, such as 185 degrees, the runway designation marking can be either 18 or 19. Supplemental letters, where required for differentiation of parallel runways, are placed between the designation numbers and the threshold or threshold marking. An alert pad, often referred to as an alert apron, is an exclusive paved area for armed aircraft to park and have immediate, unimpeded access to a runway. In the event of a declared alert, alert aircraft must be on the runway and airborne in short notice. Locating the alert pad adjacent to a runway end will allow alert aircraft to proceed directly from the apron to the runway threshold without interruptions from other traffic. Alert pads are located close to the runway threshold to allow alert aircraft to be airborne within the time constraints stipulated in their mission statements. The preferred location of alert pads is on the opposite side of the runway, away from normal traffic patterns to allow aircraft on the alert pad direct, unimpeded access to the runway. A warm-up pad, also referred to as a holding apron, is a paved area adjacent to a taxiway at or near the end of a runway. The intent of a warm-up pad is to provide a parking location, off the taxiway, for aircraft which must hold due to indeterminate delays. It allows other departing aircraft unencumbered access to the runway. Typically the end cross over taxiway is widened to 46 m [150 ft] which provides room to accommodate aircraft warming up or waiting for other reasons. The most advantageous position for a warm-up pad is adjacent to the end turnoff taxiway, between the runway and parallel taxiway. However, other design considerations such as airspace and navigational aids may make this location undesirable. If airspace and navigational aids prevent locating the warm-up pad adjacent to the end turnoff taxiway, the warm-up pad should be located at the end of and adjacent to the parallel taxiway. The arm/disarm pad is used for arming aircraft immediately before takeoff and for disarming (safing) weapons retained or not expended upon their return. An aircraft compass calibration pad is a paved area in a magnetically quiet zone where an aircraft's compass is calibrated. Hazardous cargo pads are paved areas for loading and unloading explosives and other hazardous cargo from aircraft. Hazardous cargo pads are required at facilities where the existing aprons cannot be used for loading and unloading hazardous cargo. Taxiways provide for free ground movement to and from the runways, helipads, maintenance, cargo/passenger, and other areas of the aviation facility. The objective of taxiway system planning is to create a smooth traffic flow. This system allows unobstructed ground visibility; a minimum number of changes in the aircraft's taxiing speed; and, ideally, the shortest distance between the runways or helipads and apron areas. At airfields with high levels of activity, the capacity of the taxiway system can become the limiting operational factor. Runway capacity and access efficiency can be enhanced or improved by the installation of parallel taxiways. A full length parallel taxiway may be provided for a single runway with appropriate connecting lateral taxiways to permit rapid entrance and exit of traffic between the apron and the runway. Aircraft parking aprons are the paved areas required for aircraft parking, loading, unloading, and servicing. They include the necessary maneuvering area for access and exit to parking positions. Aprons will be designed to permit safe and controlled movement of aircraft under their own power. Aircraft apron dimensions and size are based on mission requirements.

Support Structures and Facilities

Hangars provide space for various aircraft activities: scheduled inspections; landing gear tests; weighing of aircraft; major work and maintenance of fuel systems and airframes; and technical order compliance and modifications. These activities can be more effectively ccomplished while the aircraft is under complete cover. Pavement for hangar floors must be designed to support aircraft loads. Hangars provide covered floor space to accommodate aircraft. Clearance must be provided between the aircraft and the door opening, walls, and ceiling of the hangar. The aircraft maintenance facility includes, but is not limited to: aircraft maintenance hangars, special purpose hangars, hangar access aprons, weapons system support shops, aircraft system testing and repair shops, aircraft parts storage, corrosion control facilities, and special purpose maintenance pads. The aircraft maintenance area includes utilities, roadways, fencing, and security facilities and lighting. Aircraft maintenance facilities are generally located on one side of the runway to allow simplified access among maintenance areas, aircraft, and support areas. Aviation operations support facilities include those facilities that directly support the flying mission. Operations support includes air traffic control, aircraft rescue and firefighting, fueling facilities, airfield operations center (airfield management facility), squadron operations/aircraft maintenance units, and air mobility operations groups. Aviation operations support facilities are generally located along the hangar line with the central area typically being allocated to airfield operations (airfield management facility), air traffic control, aircraft rescue and firefighting, and flight simulation. Aircraft fuel storage and dispensing facilities are provided at most aviation facilities. Operating fuel storage tanks are provided where dispensing facilities are remote from bulk storage. Bulk fuel storage areas require locations which are accessible by tanker-truck, tanker-rail car, or by waterfront. Both bulk storage and operating storage areas provide for the loading and parking of fuel vehicles to service aircraft. Where hydrant fueling systems are authorized, bulk fuel storage locations take into account systems design requirements (e.g., the distance from the fueling apron to the storage tanks). Fuel storage and operating areas have requirements for minimum clearances from buildings, aircraft parking, roadways, radar, and other structures/areas, as established in service directives. Aviation fuel storage and operating areas also require lighting, fencing, and security alarms. Liquid fuel storage facility sitings address spill containment and leak protection/detection.

Navigational Aids (NAVAIDS)

Navigational Aids (NAVAIDS) assist the pilot in flight and during landing. A lighting equipment vault is provided for airfields and heliport facilities with navigational aids, and may be required at remote or stand-alone landing sites. A (NAVAID) building will be provided for airfields with navigational aids. Each type of NAVAID equipment is usually housed in a separate facility. The microwave landing system (MLS) provides the pilot of a properly equipped aircraft with electronic guidance to control the aircraft's alignment and descent until the runway environment is in sight. MLS is also used to define a missed approach course or a departure course. MLS is not particularly susceptible to signal interference as a result of buildings, trees, power lines, metal fences, and other large objects. However, when these objects are in the coverage area, they may cause multipath (signal reflection) or shadowing (signal blockage) problems. MLS antenna systems do not use the ground to form the desired signal. Grading for MLS installations is usually limited to that needed for the antenna and monitors, a service road, and a vehicle parking area.

• Azimuth Antenna (AZ) provides alignment guidance. The signal coverage area extends 40 degrees either side of the intended course (runway centerline). The AZ antenna is located on the extended runway centerline at a distance of 1,000 to 1,500 feet (300 to 450 m) beyond the stop end of the runway. AZ antennas are 8 feet (2.4 m) in height and are mounted on low impact resistant supports.
• Elevation Antenna (EL) provides descent guidance. The signal area extends from the horizon to 30 degrees above the horizon. The EL antenna height depends upon the beam width but would not exceed 18.6 feet (5.7 m). The EL antenna site is at least 400 feet (120 m) from the runway centerline and 800 to 1,000 feet (240 to 300 m) from the runway threshold and should provide a threshold crossing height of 50 feet (15 m).
• Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) provides range information. DME antennas are 22 feet (6.7 m) in height and normally are collocated with the AZ antenna. To preclude penetration of an approach surface, the collocated AZ/DME antennas should be placed 1,300 feet (390 m) from the runway end.

The instrument landing system (ILS) provides pilots with electronic guidance for aircraft alignment, descent gradient, and position until visual contact confirms the runway alignment and location. The ILS uses a line-of-sight signal from the localizer antenna and marker beacons and a reflected signal from the ground plane in front of the glide slope antenna. ILS antenna systems are susceptible to signal interference sources such as power lines, fences, metal buildings, etc. Since ILS uses the ground in front of the glide slope antenna to develop the signal, this area should be graded to remove surface irregularities.

• The Localizer Antenna (LOC) signal is used to establish and maintain the aircraft's horizontal position until visual contact confirms the runway alignment and location. The LOC antenna is sited on the extended runway centerline 1,000 to 2,000 feet (300 to 600 m) beyond the stop end of the runway. The LOC equipment shelter is placed at least 250 feet (75 m) to either side of the antenna array and within 30 degrees of the extended longitudinal axis of the antenna array.
• The Glide Slope Antenna (GS) signal is used to establish and maintain the aircraft's descent rate until visual contact confirms the runway alignment and location. A GS differentiates precision from nonprecision approaches. The GS antenna may be located on either side of the runway. The most reliable operation is obtained when the GS is located on the side of the runway offering the least possibility of signal reflections from buildings, power lines, vehicles, aircraft, etc.
• Marker beacons radiate cone or fan shaped signals vertically to activate aural and visual indicators in the cockpit marking specific points in the ILS approach. Marker beacons are located on the extended runway centerline at key points in the approach. The outer marker (OM) beacon is located 4 to 7 nautical miles (7.4 to 13 km) from the ILS runway threshold to mark the point at which glide slope altitude is verified or at which descent without glide slope is initiated. A middle marker (MM) beacon is located 2,000 to 6,000 feet (600 to 1 800 m) from the ILS runway threshold. It marks (approximately) the decision point of a CAT I ILS approach. An inner marker (IM) beacon may be located to mark the decision point of a CAT II or CAT III ILS approach. A "back course" marker beacon (comparable to an outer marker beacon) may be located to the rear of a bidirectional localizer facility to permit development of a nonprecision approach. Off airport marker beacons are located in a fenced 6-foot by 6-foot (2 m by 2 m) tract situated on the extended runway centerline. A vehicle access and parking area is required at the site.

The non-directional beacon (NDB) radiates a signal which provides directional guidance to and from the transmitting antenna. An NDB is normally mounted on a 35 foot (11 m) pole. A NDB may be located on or adjacent to the airport. Metal buildings, power lines, or metal fences should be kept 100 feet (30 m) from a NDB antenna. Electronic equipment is housed in a small collocated shelter. The standard very high frequency omnirange (VOR) located on an airport is known as a TVOR. TVORs radiate azimuth information for nonprecision instrument approach procedures. If the airport has intersecting runways, TVORs should be located adjacent to the intersection to provide approach guidance to both. TVORs should be located at least 500 feet (150 m) from the centerline of any runway and 250 feet (75 m) from the centerline of any taxiway. TVOR sites should be level within 1000 feet (300 m) of the antenna. However, a downward slope of as much as 4 percent is permitted between 200 feet (60 m) and 1,000 feet (300 m) of the antenna. From airport traffic control towers (ATCTs), ATC personnel control flight operations within the airport's designated airspace and the operation of aircraft and vehicles on the movement area. A typical ATCT site will range from 1 to 4 acres (0.4 to 1.6 hectares). Additional land may be needed for combined flight service stations/towers. Airport surveillance radars (ASR) are used to control air traffic. ASR antennas scan through 360 degrees to present the controller with the location of all aircraft within 60 nautical miles of the airport. The site for the ASR antenna is flexible. The ASR antenna should be located as close to the ATCT control room as practical. Antennas should be located at least 1,500 feet (450 m) from any building or object that might cause signal reflections and at least one-half mile (.8 km) from other electronic equipment. ASR antennas may be elevated to obtain line-of-sight clearance. Typical ASRs heights range from 25 to 85 feet (7.5 to 25.5 m) above ground. Airport surface detection equipment (ASDE) compensates for the loss of line of sight to surface traffic during periods of reduced visibility. ASDE should be sited to provide line-of-sight coverage of the entire aircraft movement area. While the ideal location for the ASDE antenna is on the ATCT cab roof, the antenna may be placed on a freestanding tower up to 100 feet (30 m) tall located within 6,000 feet (1 800 m) of the ATCT cab.

Hardened Facilities

If dispersal of aircraft is possible and consistent with active defense measures, varied parking patterns provide fewer lucrative targets for indirect-fire weapons. Prefabricated, hard parking surfaces such as landing mats increase lethal areas of bursting rounds due to induced fragmentation. Effects of other hardened surfaces, such as bituminous materials and concrete, are unknown but probably increase fragment success as well. Reduced damage from indirect-fire attacks should result when parking areas can be adequately maintained on sod or on a surface that does not cause fragment ricochet. The violent release of energy from a detonation in a gaseous medium results in a sudden pressure increase in that medium. The pressure disturbance, termed the blast wave or overpressure, is characterized by an almost instantaneous rise from the ambient pressure to a peak incident pressure (Pso). This pressure increase, or shock front, travels radially from the burst point with a diminishing velocity that always is in excess of the sonic velocity of the medium. Gas molecules making up the front move at lower velocities. This latter particle velocity is associated with a "dynamic pressure," or the pressure formed by the winds produced by the shock front. As the shock front expands into increasingly larger volumes of the medium, the peak incident pressure at the shock front decreases and the duration of the pressure increases. If the shock wave impinges on a rigid surface, oriented perpendicular to or at an angle to the direction of propagation of the wave, an additional reflected pressure instantly is developed on that rigid surface and the pressure is raised to a value that exceeds the incident pressure. This additional reflected pressure is (from that moment on) a function of the cumulative pressure in the incident wave and the pressure induced by the angle formed between the rigid surface and the plane of the initial shock front. When an explosion occurs within a structure, the peak pressure associated with the initial shock front will be extremely high, and in turn, may be amplified by its reflections with hardened surfaces in the structure. In addition, the accumulation of gases from the explosion will exert additional pressures and increase the load duration within the structure. The combined effects of these pressures may actually destroy the unreinforced structure because adequate venting for the expanding gas and the reflected shock pressures were not provided for in the original facility design analysis. For structures that have one or more strengthened walls, venting for relief of excessive gas or shock pressures, or both, may be provided by means of openings in or frangible construction of the facility walls or roof, or both. This type of construction will permit the blast wave from an internal explosion to spill over onto the exterior ground and building surfaces. These pressures (referred to as exterior or leakage pressures), once released from their confinement, expand radially and act near instantaneously on nearby structures or persons on the other side of the barrier. An important consideration in the analysis of the hazard associated with an accidental explosion is the effect of fragments generated by the explosion. These fragments are classified as primary or secondary depending on their origin.Primary fragments are formed as a result of the shattering of the explosives container. The container may be the casing of conventional munitions, the kettles, hoppers, and other metal containers used in the manufacture of explosives; the metal housing of rocket engines; and similar items. These fragments usually are small in size and travel initially at velocities of the order of thousands of feet per second. Secondary fragments are formed as a result of high blast pressures on structural components and items in close proximity to the explosion. These fragments are somewhat larger in size than primary fragments and travel initially at velocities in the order of hundreds of feet per second. A hazardous (life threatening) fragment is one having an impact energy of 58 ft-lb (79 joules) or greater.

        

Barricades, if properly designed and located, stop fragments. A barricade at the source can reduce fragment speed and density where high-density exposures of personnel and equipment may occur. A secondary barricade at sites of mission-essential equipment and personnel (such as wing communications and trim pads) can provide some additional protection; however, high-angle, low-velocity fragments will still impact the exposed site. Earth-Filled, Steel-Bin-Type Barricades (ARMCO, Republic type, or equal) will prevent simultaneous detonation of adjacent explosives; however, they will not prevent major damage or destruction of aircraft or munitions. Revetments are barricades constructed to limit or direct a blast to reduce damages from low flying fragments and limit simultaneous detonation. Often used to form modules for open storage of munitions or protected aircraft parking. A module is a barricaded area comprised of a series of connected cells with hard surface storage pads separated from each other by barricades. A light metal shed or other lightweight fire retardant cover may be used for weather protection for individual cells. Thin-walled revetments have been developed for protection of attack, utility, and cargo-type helicopters. These revetments have plywood or corrugated metal walls and contain 12 inches of soil fill. Thin-walled revetments may be post-supported or freestanding. Post-supported revetments use either timber or pipe posts and are designed primarily for protection of cargo-type helicopters. Freestanding revetments are designed for protection of utility and attack helicopters. They provide protection from fragmentation of near misses (10 meters) from mortars and artillery rounds up to 155 millimeters. Thin-walled revetments (12 inches thick) require less fill material, space, equipment, and construction time than thick-walled revetments (4 feet or more). Revetments constructed with filled sandbags are a practical expedient for fortifications, particularly when equipment is limited to hand tools or when skilled personnel are not available to supervise the construction of other types of protective structures. Fill the bags at the construction site with sand hauled to the location. The bags also can be filled where the sand is available and hauled to the site; however, this procedure is less preferable because the bags may be damaged during handling. A disadvantage of sandbag revetments is that the bags deteriorate rapidly, particularly in damp climates. Thus, the filler material may run out, reducing the protective characteristics and endangering the stability of the revetment. Shell hits may require replacement of bags. Aircraft in closed Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS) will remain operable should an explosion occur in an adjacent shelter or ready service storage facility. However, adjacent structures, aircraft and stored munitions may be substantially damaged or destroyed. These aircraft may not be immediately removable due to debris. For shelters with third generation-type rear doors, the aircraft may be damaged substantially unless modifications have been made to prevent the rear doors from being blown against the aircraft.

• USAFE TAB VEE--24-feet radius semicircular arch, 48 feet wide by 100.8 feet long, front closure prow shaped, vertically hinged, recessed door.
• First Generation Aircraft Shelter (TAB VEE Modified). 24-feet radius semicircular arch, 48 feet wide by 100.8 feet long, front closure prow shaped, laterally opening, external flush door.
• Second Generation Aircraft Shelter. 29.4-feet double-radius, pseudoelliptical arch, 82 feet wide by 124 feet long, vertical reinforced concrete panel, laterally opening, sliding, external flush door.
• Third Generation Aircraft Shelter. 27.4-feet double-radius, pseudoelliptical arch, 70.8 feet wide by 120 feet long, vertical reinforced concrete panel, laterally opening, sliding, external flush door. Personnel door at one side with barricade.
• Korean TAB VEE. 24-feet radius semicircular arch, 48 feet wide by 100.8 feet long, open front. Exhaust port in rear wall protected only by a blast deflector barricade (otherwise identical to USAFE TAB VEE). When hardened doors are installed, consider these shelters as TAB VEE Modified.
• Korean Flow-Through--Constructed from third generation drawing but omits front door, back wall, and personnel door, 70.8 feet wide by 120 feet long, 27.4-feet double-radius, pseudoelliptical arch.

Barricaded open-storage modules provide a high degree of protection against propagation of explosion by blast and fragments. However, if flammable materials are present in nearby cells, subsequent propagation of explosion by fire is possible. In the event of an unplanned detonation in an adjacent cell, munitions may be covered with earth and unavailable for use until extensive uncovering operations and possibly maintenance are completed. An Explosives Storage Area is a designated area of explosives-containing facilities set aside for the exclusive storage or "warehousing" of the base explosives stocks. Facilities include igloos, magazines, operating buildings, modules, revetments, and outdoors storage sites. Magazines are of two general types: igloo (earth-covered) and aboveground (no earth covering). An aboveground magazine is any structure or facility, without sufficient earth covering, used for the storage of explosives. Earth-covered magazines (igloo or underground) are preferred for the storage of all explosives. Priority is given to covered storage (igloos) for items requiring protection from the elements or long term storage. Igloo magazines are used to store all types of explosives and are preferred for mass detonating explosives where moisture condensation is not a problem. They are earth-covered, and are either of a concrete or steel arch-type construction. The steel arch type is normally more economical to construct than the reinforced concrete igloo. This is especially true where the cost of additional land area and connecting road net required to construct a multiple igloo complex is considered. The steel arch-earth covered igloo has a concrete floor, foundations, side arches, and a rear and front wall. It may be constructed in variable lengths in 0.6 m (2 ft) increments and in widths up to 9.1 m (30 ft ). The arch is constructed of heavy gauge corrugated steel plates, and the double leaf doors are of heavy blast resistant steel.
The primary objective of an earth-covered magazine is to provide protection for its assets. Substantial deformation of the magazine may occur, however, the stored assets should be protected. Earth-covered magazines provide virtually complete protection against propagation of explosions by blast, fragments, and fire; however, there may be structural failures in the magazines concrete barrels and walls, possible severe damage of front walls, and damage to doors and ventilators. Munitions assets are expected to remain serviceable following an explosion in an adjacent earth covered magazine. The earth-covered magazines types are defined by the effects on the head wall and blast door hardness. All earth-covered magazines have the same earth-cover requirements. The earth cover over an igloo magazine will normally be at least 2 feet deep. Lightning protection systems feature air terminals, low impedance paths to ground, sideflash protection, surge suppression of all conductive penetrations into the protected area, and earth electrode systems. Structural elements of the building may serve as air terminals, down conductors, or the earth electrode. For air terminals to be omitted on earth covered igloos the reinforcing bars or steel arch must be electrically bonded between structural elements and connected to the grounding system.

                                            Thank you for reading my blog :)

               AHMET ALPER GÖL 
                     140131035 

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS / OXYGEN SUPPLY (Tayfun KAYIRAN)

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

In aviation, visual meteorological conditions (or VMC) is an aviation flight category in which visual flight rules (VFR) flight is permitted—that is, conditions in which pilots have sufficient visibility to fly the aircraft maintaining visual separation from terrain and other aircraft. They are the opposite of instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The boundary criteria between IMC and VMC are known as the VMC minima and are defined by: visibility, cloud ceilings (for takeoffs and landings), and cloud clearances.

The exact requirements vary by type of airspace, whether it is day or night (for countries that permit night VFR), and from country to country. Typical visibility requirements vary from one statute mile to five statute miles (many countries define these in metric units as 1,500 m to 8 km).

Typical cloud clearance requirements vary from merely remaining clear of clouds to remaining at least one mile away (1,500 m in some countries) from clouds horizontally and 1,000 feet away from clouds vertically. For instance, in Australia, VMC minima outside controlled airspace are clear of cloud with 5,000 m visibility below 3,000 ft AMSL or 1,000 ft AGL (whichever is higher), and 1,000 ft vertical/1,500 m horizontal separation from cloud above these altitudes or in controlled airspace. Above 10,000 ft, 8,000 m visibility is required to maintain VMC. Air traffic control may also issue a "special VFR" clearance to VFR aircraft, to allow departure from a control zone in less than VMC – this reduces the visibility minimum to 1,600 m.

Generally, VMC requires greater visibility and cloud clearance in controlled airspace than in uncontrolled airspace. In uncontrolled airspace there is less risk of a VFR aircraft colliding with an instrument flight rules (IFR) aircraft emerging from a cloud, so aircraft are permitted to fly closer to clouds. An exception to this rule is class B airspace, in which ATC separates VFR traffic from all other traffic (VFR or IFR), which is why in class B airspace lower cloud clearance is permitted.

ICAO recommends the VMC minima internationally; they are defined in national regulations, which rarely significantly vary from ICAO. The main variation is in the units of measurement as different states use different units of measurement in aviation. The minima tend to be stricter in controlled airspace, where there is a lot of traffic therefore greater visibility and cloud clearance is desirable. The degree of separation provided by air traffic control is also a factor. For example, in class A and B airspace where all aircraft are provided with positive separation, the VMC minima feature visibility limits only, whereas in classes C–G airspace where some or all aircraft are not separated from each other by air traffic control, the VMC minima also feature cloud separation criteria.

It is important not to confuse IMC with IFR (instrument flight rules) – IMC describes the actual weather conditions, while IFR describes the rules under which the aircraft is flying. Aircraft can (and often do) fly IFR in clear weather, for operational reasons or when flying in airspace where flight under VFR is not permitted; indeed by far the majority of commercial flights are operated solely under IFR.

It is possible to be flying VFR in conditions that are legally considered VMC and have to rely on flight instruments for attitude control because there is no distinct external horizon, for example, on a dark night over water (which may create a so-called black hole effect) or a clear night with lights on the water and stars in the sky looking the same

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OXYGEN SUPPLY

Aircraft emergency oxygen systems are emergency equipment fitted to pressurized commercial aircraft, intended for use when thecabin pressurisation system has failed and the cabin altitude has climbed above a safe level. It consists of a number of individual oxygen masks stored in compartments near passenger seats and near areas like lavatories and galleys, and an oxygen source, like a centralized gaseous cylinder or decentralized chemical oxygen generator.

Most commercial aircraft that operate at high flight altitudes are pressurized at a maximum cabin altitude of approximately 8,000 feet, where it is possible to breathe normally without an oxygen mask. On most pressurized aircraft, if cabin pressure is lost when the cabin altitude is above 14,000 feet, compartments containing the oxygen masks will open automatically, either above or in front of the passenger and crew seats, and the oxygen masks will drop down in front of the passenger. Oxygen masks may also drop on extremely rough landings or during severe turbulence if the oxygen mask panel becomes loose. Rows of seats typically have an extra mask (i.e. 3 seats, 4 masks), in case someone has an infant in their lap, or someone in the aisle needs to grab one.

An oxygen mask consists of a yellow, soft, silicone facial cup with white elastic bands for securing the mask to the passenger's face. This band is adjustable by pulling two ends looped through the facial cup. The mask may also have a concentrator or re-breather bag that may or may not inflate depending on the cabin altitude, which has (in some instances) made passengers nervous the mask was not providing adequate oxygen, causing some to remove them, who thereby suffered hypoxia. All airlines now make a point in the safety video or demonstration to point out that the bag may not inflate. The bag is attached to a tube, connected to the oxygen source in the compartment, allowing for it to drop down and hang in front of the passengers. To operate on all aircraft except the L-1011, they must be pulled sharply toward the passenger who needs it to un-clip the flow pin and start the process of transporting the oxygen to the passenger. Passenger oxygen masks cannot deliver enough oxygen for sustained periods at high altitudes. This is why the flight crew needs to place the aircraft in a controlled emergency descent to a lower altitude where it is possible to breathe without emergency oxygen. While the masks are being used, passengers are not allowed to leave their seat for any reason until it is safe to breathe without the emergency oxygen. If there is a fire on board the aircraft, masks are not deployed, as the production of oxygen may further fuel the fire.

Aircraft safety cards and in-flight safety demonstrations shown at the beginning of each flight explain the location and use of oxygen masks.

Some aircraft, such as the SAAB Series Aircraft and the 1900D, have a mask system where either a mask is stored under the seat or is distributed by the cabin attendant. These masks are removed from packaging and plugged into the socket for oxygen supply.

·         A chemical oxygen generator system connected to all masks in the compartment. Pulling down on one oxygen mask removes the firing pin of the generator igniting a mixture of sodium chlorate and iron powder, opening the oxygen supply for all the masks in the compartment. Oxygen production cannot be shut off once a mask is pulled, and oxygen production typically lasts at least 15 minutes. During the production of oxygen, the generator becomes extremely hot and should not be touched. A burning smell may be noted and cause alarm among passengers, but this smell is a normal part of the chemical reaction. This system can be found on the MD-80 aircraft, whose system is also unique in the fact that the face masks are clipped to the inside of the compartment door and do not drop out and hang, by the oxygen tube, in front of the passengers. "For any aircraft which carries more than a very few passengers, the weight, complexity and maintenance issues associated with a compressed gas system would be prohibitive. As a consequence, the industry relies on chemical oxygen generators."^[1]

·         A gaseous manifold system, which connects all oxygen masks to a central oxygen supply, usually in the cargo hold area. Pulling down on one oxygen mask starts the oxygen supply for that mask only. The entire system can usually be reset in the cockpit or in some other location in the aircraft.

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Thank you for reading my blog !!!

                                            Tayfun KAYIRAN

                                                               130131040

FLIGHT PREPARATION

FLIGHT PREPARATION

Flight Preparation and Conducting Effective Briefings

Briefing Note

           

1 Background

This briefing note illustrates the importance of flight preparation and discusses the details of conducting effective briefings. It provides an outline of how to structure and conduct effective preflight briefings. The focus is not only on briefings between the pilots but also on including the entire crew in order to promote synergy.

This briefing note is not intended to modify or supersede a company’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) for flight preparation. This information represents a minimum that should be covered for proper flight preparation.

2 Introduction

Flight preparation is part of the transition from normal life to the highly dynamic environment of flight. Briefings are an essential part of flight preparation and represent a critical moment for team building, leadership establishment and an opportunity to gather and select all operational data pertinent to the upcoming flight.

In-depth takeoff, cruise and approach/go-around briefings should be conducted before each flight to ensure understanding among crewmembers and the effective application of crew resource management (CRM). A thorough briefing should be conducted regardless of how familiar the crewmembers are with the flight plan and each other. This is one of the most critical moments for developing crew synergy because vital and often irreversible decisions are made (e.g., dispatch fuel quantity, loading, deicing, routing). By the end of the flight-preparation phase, the crew should have a shared mental model of the flight plan and possible problems that might arise in normal operations. Also, the crew should agree upon procedures to be used in case of unexpected events that might disrupt the normal pattern of flight operations.

3 Data

Many aviation incidents and accidents can be linked in some way to flaws in flight preparation. The quality of approach and go-around briefings has been determined to be a causal factor in approximately 50 percent of approach and landing accidents (Flight Safety Foundation, 1998-1999). Most of the incidents and accidents related to poor flight preparation are due to:

§  Lack of understanding of prevailing conditions

§  Loss of horizontal or vertical situational awareness

§  Poor crew coordination

4 Briefings Overview

Briefings should help both the pilot flying (PF) and the pilot not flying (PNF) understand the desired sequence of events and actions, as well as the condition of the aircraft and any special hazards or circumstances involved in the planned flight sequence. To achieve the safety and efficiency benefits of good flight preparation, all crewmembers should strive for high-quality briefings.

4.1 Objectives of briefings

When conducting any briefing, the following objectives should be met:

§  Define and communicate action plans and expectations under normal and abnormal conditions

§  Confirm applicable task sharing (i.e., crewmembers’ roles and responsibilities)

§  Brief each subject area to its appropriate level of detail

§  Promote questioning and feedback

§  Ensure full understanding and agreement on the correct sequence of actions

§  Communicate objectives to other crewmembers (cabin crew) and develop synergy

§  Enhance the preparedness of the flight crew and cabin crew for facing unusual requirements or responding to unexpected conditions

The quality of the flight crew/cabin crew and flight crew takeoff and approach briefings shapes crew performance throughout the flight. Preflight briefings should start at the dispatch office when the dispatcher gives the flight plan to the flight crew for review and the crew’s final decision on theroute, cruise flight level and fuel quantity.

The on-board crew formation briefing and the flight crew takeoff and approach briefings should include the following:

. Crew familiarization with the departure and arrival airports and routes

. The maintenance state of the aircraft (e.g., inoperative items, recent repairs)

. Fatigue state of crewmembers (e.g., short-haul/multi-sector operations)

. Takeoff, departure, approach and landing conditions (e.g., weather, runway conditions, special hazards)

. Lateral and vertical navigation, including intended use of automation

. Communications

. Status of cabin from the cabin crew

. Status of abnormal procedures as applicable (e.g., rejected takeoff, diversion, missed approach/goaround)

. Review and discussion of takeoff and departure hazards

4.2 Timeliness of briefings

Briefings should be conducted during low-workload periods. The takeoff briefing should be conducted while the aircraft is at the gate or other parking position.

The descent preparation and the approach and go-around briefings should typically be completed 10 minutes before reaching the top-of-descent to prevent increasing workload and rushing the descent preparations.

4.3 Techniques for conducting effective briefings

The importance of briefing technique is often underestimated. The style and tone of a briefing play an important role in its effectiveness. Interactive briefings (e.g., confirming agreement and understanding by the PNF after each phase of the briefing) are more effective and productive than an uninterrupted lecture from the PF followed by: “Any questions?” Interactive briefings provide the PF and PNF with an opportunity to communicate and to check and correct each other as necessary (e.g., confirming the use of the correct departure and approach charts, confirming the correct setup of navaids for the assigned takeoff and landing runways).

The briefing itself should be based on the logical sequence of flight phases. It is important, however, to avoid the routine and formal repetition of the same points on each sector, which often becomes counterproductive because it involves no new thinking or problem solving. For example, adapting and expanding a briefing by highlighting the special aspects of an airport, the departure or approach procedure, or the prevailing weather conditions and circumstances usually result in a more lively and effective briefing.

Briefings should be conducted by speaking face-to-face, while remaining alert and vigilant in the monitoring of the aircraft and flight progress. The briefing technique of the PF should encourage effective listening to attract the PNF’s attention. The briefing should therefore be conducted when the workload of the PNF is low enough to permit effective communication.

Whether anticipated or not, a significant change in an air traffic control (ATC) clearance, weather conditions, landing runway or aircraft condition requires a crew to review relevant parts of previously completed briefings. A re-briefing is almost always beneficial under these circumstances.

5 Takeoff Briefing

The takeoff briefing is conducted by the pilot designated as PF for the particular flight leg. It enables the PF to inform the PNF of the planned course of actions (e.g., expectations, roles and responsibilities, unique requirements) for both normal and abnormal conditions during takeoff. A full takeoff briefing should be conducted during the first sector of the day. Subsequent briefings should be limited to the specific aspects of each individual airport/runway/takeoff/departure condition. The takeoff briefing should be guided and illustrated by referring to the applicable flight management system (FMS) pages, the paper or electronic charts and the navigation display to visualize the departure route and confirm the various data entries. Some of the important topics to review in a takeoff briefing are discussed below. The important point is that a takeoff briefing must be comprehensive and based on complete situational awareness gained from the available documentation and data.

5.1 ATIS

The automatic terminal information service (ATIS) is a recorded message broadcast at major airports. It provides flight crews with up-to-date information on weather, runway in use and other operational information. The ATIS message is updated whenever the situation changes significantly, with the new version designated by the next letter of the alphabet.

All pilots approaching the airport are required to monitor the ATIS and review the message, including:

§  Expected takeoff runway in use and standard instrument departure (SID)

§  Altimeter (QNH or QFE)

§  Transition altitude (if variable with QNH)

§  Weather, temperature and dew point

§  Wind and runway condition

§  Unusual airport conditions (e.g., closed taxiways, presence of work crews)

5.2 NOTAMs

Notices to airmen (NOTAMs) provide crews with critical information that may have a direct effect on flight safety (e.g., unserviceable navaids, change of departure routing, airspace restrictions, work in progress on taxiways and/or runways, obstructions, man-made obstacles, volcanic activity). NOTAM coverage can be national, regional, specific to one route or specific to a given airport. NOTAMs generally do not include detailed explanations and graphics. As a result, interpretation of a NOTAM can sometimes be difficult. Each pilot should therefore review applicable takeoff and departure NOTAMs and discuss their possible impacts on operations with fellow crewmembers. If there is any doubt about the contents or interpretation of a NOTAM, pilots should contact the company dispatch office for clarification.

5.3 Weather

It is important to discuss the effects of prevailing weather conditions on takeoff and departure procedures (e.g., use of weather radar for suspected wind shear, requirement for an alternate runway, use of engine and wing anti-ice). Use information from the weather briefing conducted by your dispatcher and from the latest ATIS. Not only is this important for safety reasons but also because being fully aware of the weather conditions will allow you to respond effectively to any questioning from passengers or cabin crew if the flight is delayed or cancelled.

For long-range flights, pilots need to understand that weather forecasts are derived from mathematical and statistical models that are not always accurate. Crews must use their knowledge and experience of the local peculiarities in the weather patterns and brief each other concerning potential problems that the forecast may not highlight. For example, mountainous areas or shorelines may generate sudden changes in ceiling, visibility or winds, and all crewmembers need to have an accurate understanding of the probability of such events.

Special care needs to be taken when deciphering the full meaning of a weather-related message. Crewmembers often focus on a single aspect of the weather forecast and miss other important information (e.g., focusing on fluctuating visibility and missing crosswind information). In order to enhance situational awareness, crews should go through each item of the forecast and discuss its implications for flight.

5.4 Dispatch conditions affecting takeoff performance

Review and discuss anything that affects takeoff performance (e.g., takeoff weight or speeds) or fuel consumption to make sure that dispatch conditions are compatible with the upcoming flight. Pay close attention to combinations of conditions, particularly multiple inoperative items, that together may produce an unacceptable situation.

It is important to examine entries in the technical log book as part of the formal dialogue between maintenance and flight crews. Any malfunctioning item reported by a flight crew should be accompanied by an appropriate answer from the maintenance team. Effective cooperation and reciprocal confidence between maintenance and flight deck personnel are essential for safety.

The answer to a crew remark can be either a summary of the work done to fix the problem or a transfer of the item to the minimum equipment list (MEL) or configuration deviation list (CDL). Flight crewmembers should consider any maintenance response as an alert and either focus their attention during the walk-around inspection to the area where the work occurred or prompt in-depth consideration of the airworthiness of the aircraft with the particular item missing or inoperative.

Any entry in the MEL or CDL should trigger an allowance of time to replace or repair the item. Pressure is often put on (or felt by) the flight crew to defer making a log entry in order to avoid costly maintenance actions or the grounding of the aircraft. Pilots should never yield to this pressure because it could lead to serious safety issues.

Efforts have been made to increase the reliability of a signed “release for service.” Nevertheless, direct exchanges between maintenance staff and flight crewmembers are still the best way to ensure awareness of the state of the aircraft for the planned mission.

5.5 Takeoff performance limitations

Review and discuss prevailing takeoff performance limitations (e.g., runway, second segment climb, obstacles) as well as any specific takeoff performance limitations (e.g., minimum climb gradient during a SID, nonstandard turn).

5.6 Weight and balance data, load sheet review

Review the weight and balance data — either preliminary data from the flight plan or final Load and Trim Sheet — with appropriate crewmembers and apply the specifications in the aircraft manual. Pilots must understand when it is necessary to rearrange passengers or cargo to bring the aircraft into conformance with specifications and maintain balance.

5.7 Runway condition and wind

Confirm the expected takeoff runway, the runway condition and wind component. This is a basic step, but it is common for runway conditions to change, and the crew must be ready to respond to any unexpected events. Make specific plans to verify that the aircraft is on the correct runway before applying takeoff power

5.8 Takeoff data

Confirm the computed takeoff data for the prevailing conditions including:

§  Slats/flaps configuration

§  V-speeds (i.e., V1, VR, V2 - F, S, Green Dot speeds or V3, V4, VFTO)

§  Thrust setting (i.e., use of takeoff thrust or reduced/derated thrust)

§  Bleed-air configuration for takeoff (i.e., air-conditioning packs, engine anti-ice, wing anti-ice)

5.9 Noise abatement procedure

Review and discuss the applicable noise-abatement procedure, particularly if the noise abatement procedure is not standard or is not programmed in the FMS.

5.10 Departure route

Review and discuss the following elements by referencing the FMS control display unit, navigation display, autopilot/autothrust control panel and chart:

§  First cleared altitude (if departure clearance is available)

§  Transition altitude

§  Routing (i.e., speed and/or altitude constraints, airspace restrictions, terrain/minimum safe altitude)

§  Specific procedures in case of loss of communication

§  Special procedures or considerations

5.11 Navaids setup — use of automation

Set navaids as required to fly and/or cross-check the correct tracking of the SID.

5.12 Rejected takeoff briefing

Include considerations for a rejected takeoff (RTO), including:

§  Stop or go decision

§  Stop actions

§  Go actions

5.13 Fuel policy

Discuss the fuel on board. This is often the final point of the takeoff briefing. Many factors such as weather, estimated load, NOTAMs, local cost of fuel and company policies have to be taken into account and discussed as part of this final step of the briefing.

6 Taxi to Active Runway Briefings

The taxi phase is a critical one and should be carefully briefed. Use the following guidelines as an outline for effective taxi briefings:

§  Perform a review of the expected taxi routes using the airport chart with special attention to “hot spots” such as intersections where the risk of confusion and the resulting risk of a taxiway or runway incursion may exist.

§  Plan the execution of checks and actions to be performed during taxi in order to prevent distraction by cockpit duties when approaching hot spots. Pay particular attention to temporary situations such as work in progress, other unusual activity and recent changes in airport layout.

§  Refer again to the airport diagram when taxi instructions are received from ATC. The PF and PNF should agree on the assigned runway and taxi route, including instructions to hold short of or cross an intersecting runway and verbally confirm their agreement. The expectations established during the takeoff briefing can be significantly altered with a different and unexpected taxi clearance. Pilots should be prepared to follow the clearance actually received, not the clearance expected.

§  Discuss low-visibility taxi procedures and routes (if published and applicable to the particular flight) and the characteristics of the airport surface movements guidance and control system (SMGCS).

§  Discuss any intended deviation from SOPs or from standard calls.

§  Confirm the elements of the detailed takeoff briefing for possible changes (e.g., runway change, intersection takeoff, runway condition change, revised departure clearance).

§  Confirm the takeoff data or modify the aircraft configuration (flaps and bleed air), thrust setting and the FMS/autopilot setup, as required.

7 Cruise Briefing(s)

One or more cruise briefings are recommended if the duration of the cruise phase is sufficient and pilot workload is not unusually high. A structured cruise briefing or repeated cruise briefings should cover:

§  Strategy in case of engine failure (e.g., speed strategy depending on obstacles and extended operations (ETOPS) or non-ETOPS nature of flight, preferred diversion airfield depending on aircraft position)

§  Strategy in case of cabin depressurization (e.g., speed strategy and descent profile)

8 Approach Briefing

No matter how many times pilots have performed a particular approach and landing, it is vitally important to conduct an effective approach briefing. FMS pages should be used to guide and illustrate the briefing and to confirm the various data entries. The items to be considered for an approach briefing are listed below.

 8.1 Aircraft status

Review the aircraft status, (e.g., inoperative items, any failure or malfunction experienced during the flight) and discuss the possible consequences in terms of operation and performance (e.g., final approach speed and landing distance).

8.2 Fuel status

Review the fuel status by examining:

§  Fuel on board

§  Minimum diversion fuel

§  Available holding fuel and time

8.3 ATIS

Review and discuss the following ATIS information:

§  Runway in use (type of approach)

§  Expected arrival route (standard terminal arrival [STAR] or radar vectors)

§  Altimeter setting (QNH or QFE) and the applicable altimeter setting unit (hectopascals or inches of mercury)

§  Transition level (either provided by ATIS or the standard transition levels used in the country or for the airport)

§  Terminal weather (e.g., icing conditions, turbulence, suspected low-level wind shear, ceiling, visibility and runway visual range (RVR))

§  Advisory messages (as applicable)

8.4 NOTAMs

Review and discuss enroute and terminal NOTAMs for possible operational impact (e.g., unserviceable navaids, airspace restriction, obstructions) or additional threats or hazards. If there is any doubt about the contents or interpretation of a NOTAM, contact the company for confirmation.

8.5 Top-of-descent point

Confirm or adjust the top-of-descent (TOD) point computed by the FMS as a function of the expected arrival following the published STAR or expected radar vectors. Be aware of the resulting track distance between the TOD point and the runway threshold.

8.6 Approach chart

Review and discuss the following items relating to the approach chart and the FMS/navigation display (ND):

§  Designated runway

§  Approach type

§  Task assignments (confirm the designated PF for the approach based on company policy for the type of approach to be flown)

§  Chart index number and date

§  Minimum safe altitude (MSA) — reference point, sectors and minimum sector safe altitudes

§  Let-down navaid(s), type, frequency and identifier (confirm the correct setup of navaids)

§  Radio frequencies (discuss special procedures in case of loss of communications, as applicable)

§  Airport elevation

§  Approach transitions (initial approach fix (IAF), intermediate fix (IF), other fixes, holding pattern, altitude and speed constraints/restrictions, required navaids setup)

§  Final approach course (and lead-in radial, as applicable)

§  Terrain features (location and elevation of hazardous terrain or man-made obstacles, even if they are below the minimum descent altitude (MDA/H))

§  Approach profile view, including crossing altitudes and DME distances, as applicable, including:

§  Final approach fix (FAF)

§  Final descent point (if different from FAF)

§  Outer marker (OM), as applicable

§  Visual descent point (VDP), if indicated on approach profile or computed by the flight crew

§  Missed approach point (MAP)

§  Typical vertical speed for the expected final approach groundspeed

§  Touchdown zone elevation (TDZE)

§  Missed approach, including:

§  Lateral and vertical navigation, particularly the initial lateral and vertical maneuvers

§  Speed restrictions

§  Obstacles

§  Visibility and RVR minimums (and ceiling, if applicable)

§  Descent and decision minimums

§  MDA(H) for nonprecision approaches

§  Barometric DA(H) for CAT I ILS approaches

§  Radio altimeter DH for CAT II and CAT III ILS approaches

§  Local airport requirement (e.g., noise restrictions on the use of thrust reversers)

§  Any hazards or possible sources of visual confusion (e.g., lights on the ground in the approach path) shown on the chart

8.7 Airport diagram

Review and discuss the following items using the airport chart:

§  Runway length, width and slope

§  Approach end runway lighting, and other expected visual references

§  Specific hazards (as applicable)

§  Intended turnoff taxiway and available alternates

If another airport is located in the close vicinity of the destination airport, relevant details or procedures should be discussed for awareness purposes.

8.8 Use of automation

Discuss the intended use of automation for vertical and lateral guidance and for speed management depending on FMS navigation accuracy (only for aircraft not equipped with a global positioning system (GPS) or if GPS PRIMARY LOST is displayed):

§  Use of FMS vertical navigation and lateral navigation or use of selected vertical modes and lateral modes

§  Step-down approach (if a constant-angle nonprecision approach [CANPA] is not available or not possible)

8.9 Use of aircraft systems

Discuss the use of the following aircraft systems, depending on prevailing conditions:

§  Engine nacelle anti-ice

§  Wing anti-ice

§  Weather radar

8.10 Landing and stopping

Discuss the intended landing flaps configuration (if different from full flaps). Review and discuss the following features of the intended landing runway:

§  Surface condition — nature and depth of contaminant

§  Intended use of autobrake and thrust reversers

§  Expected turnoff taxiway

8.11 Taxi to gate

Just as with taxi prior to takeoff, this phase should be considered as a critical phase of flight and be carefully briefed. This briefing can be delayed until after landing. Review and discuss the following items:

§  Anticipated taxiways to the assigned gate, with special emphasis on the possible crossing of, or movement on, active runways

§  Nonstandard lighting or marking of taxiways

§  Possible work in progress on runways and taxiways

8.12 CAT II and CAT III ILS briefing

For CAT II and CAT III ILS approaches, perform the specific briefing in accordance with company SOPs.

8.13 Deviations from SOPs

Any intended deviation from SOPs or from standard calls should be discussed during the briefing.

9 Go-Around Briefing

A detailed go-around briefing should be included in the descent-and-approach briefing, highlighting the key points of the go-around maneuver and missed-approach procedures, and the planned task sharing under normal or abnormal conditions. The go-around briefing should include the following key topics:

§  Go-around callout (i.e., a loud and clear go-around/flaps call)

§  PF and PNF task sharing (e.g., flow of respective actions, including use of the autopilot, speed restrictions, go-around altitude, parameter-excessive-deviation callouts)

§  Intended use of automation (i.e., automatic or manual go-around, use of FMS lateral navigation or use of selected modes for missed approach)

§  Missed approach lateral navigation and vertical profile (e.g., speed limitations, airspace restrictions, potential obstacles, terrain features)

§  Intentions (i.e., second approach or diversion)

§  If a second approach is intended, discuss the type of approach if a different runway or type of approach is planned

§  Confirm the minimum diversion fuel

It is recommended to briefly recap the main points of the go-around and missed approach when established on the final approach course or after completing the landing checklist.

10 Key Points

Conducting effective briefings is an essential part of flight preparation. Without proper preparation, a crew will not have the necessary situational awareness to fly at maximum effectiveness and safety. Briefings are necessary at various points in the flight from before taxiing to the departure runway through taxiing to the arrival gate.

The following summary points apply to all briefings:

§  Briefings should be adapted to the specific conditions of the flight and focus on the items that are relevant for the particular takeoff, departure, cruise or approach and landing.

§  Briefings should be interactive and allow for dialogue between the PF, PNF and other crewmembers.

§  Briefings should be conducted during low-workload periods.

§  Briefings should be conducted even if the crew has completed the same flight many times in the past. Vary the briefing approach or emphasis when on familiar routes to promote thinking and to avoid doing things by habit.

§  Briefings should cover procedures for unexpected events.

§  Pilots should not fixate on one particular aspect of information in a briefing, as other important information may be missed.

                                                    Thank you for listening :)

            130131035
       CEYDA ILHAN